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THIRD WORLD WOMEN, WORLD POPULATION GROWTH:
A CASE OF BLAMING THE VICTIM?*
Elizabeth W. Moen
University of Colorado, Boulder
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the provisions of the 1974 United
Nations World Population Conference pertaining to the
status of women, wherein it is assumed that if the
status of women is improved and they are educated and
employed, fertility will decline. It is concluded
that these assumptions do not have very sound theoret-
ical or empirical bases, and that the possibility and
probability of implementation in the near future is
slim. It is hypothesized that the Conference World
Plan of Action will do little to raise the status of
women or reduce population growth because it is a
product of sexual politics.
INTRODUCTION
In the sunmer of 1974, the United Nations (UN) held a World
Population Conference. The subject of population growth and fertil-
ity control had come a long way since 1959 when President
Eisenhower declared bith control is "...a subject that is not a
proper political or governmental activity or function or respon-
sibility" (Piotrow, 1973:X). By 1974 family planning and population
growth were not only legitimate subjects of governmental concern,
but during that time there had been an intellectual and ideological
movement toward consensus about the interrelationships among population
growth, family planning, and economic development.
Briefly, the consensus position (which I hold) begins with "...a
frank recognition that population growth is not the only, or even the
primary source of poverty, disease, illiteracy and gross inequality
which now characterizes the world" (Teitelbaum, 1974:754). The
solutions to these problems are thought to lie in true economic and
* For criticism, comment and editorial assistance I would like to
thank Wendy Wolf, Karen Skold, Jesseli Moen, and Becky Goodrich.
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social development, not contraception. Implicit in this view is the
belief that development cannot occur without redistribution of power
and resources within, if not among, nations. On the other hand, the
consensus position also acknowledges that rapid population growth
impedes economic development because resources necessary to raise the
standard of living must be used to keep up an ever larger population,
and because with continuous high fertility the burden of youth depend-
ency continually increases while the proportion of the population which
can be alloted to an adult labor force continually decreases.
Consequently, it is essential for the success of social and economic
development programs that governments educate the public about the
significance of family size, provide the knowledge and means to control
fertility, and remove all obstacles to their access. Finally, it is
believed that fertility reduction and development interact, each
helping the other to become more prevalent and more rapid.
The World Population Conference
It was hoped, even assumed by many, that the World Population
Conference would start from the consensus viewpoint and begin working
for the dual goals of lower fertility and a higher standard of living
in the less developed countries (LDC's). Instead, the false issue of
family planning or development was resurrected, and as one demographer
has bemoaned"...every old ghost of the anti-Malthusian past...resur-
faced, clothed in the new slick trappings of demographic chic" (Stycos,
1974:160). While no two nations presented the issues in exactly the
same way, four general positions have been identified (Mauldin, Choucri,
et al., 1974):
(1) Population problems are problems of inequality, and Malthusians
who are urging "artificial" population policies such as family planning
do so to direct attention from the true issues of development. Rapid
population growth is a positive force for economic and social develop-
ment, and fertility will eventually decline, but as a "natural" process
resulting from development. This was the position of China, Albania,
Romania, Cuba, Peru, Sub-Saharan Africa, Algeria, and Argentina. It is
the most extreme position in that it is the only one to say that rapid
population growth is beneficial.
(2) The position of the Eastern European countries (excluding
Romania and Yugoslavia) is similar to the first but also states that
each mode of production has its own laws of population, and that the
problems of the Third World are a characteristic of capitalism and
result from international colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.
Accordingly, there is no need for population policies, for in a properly
organized society social and economic forces will make the proper demo-
graphic adjustments. Here again is the notion of a "natural" decline in
fertility.
(3) The third position, held by India, Egypt, Mexico, Yugoslavia,
Italy, and some Latin American countries, is similar to the first two in
emphasizing the need for more equitable distribution of the world's re-
sources, but it also stresses the need for effective population policies
and programs as well as those for development.
(4) According to most of Asia, most of Western Europe, the
Scandinavian countries, the British Commonwealth, Japan and the United
States, rapid development as well as strong population policies and pro-
grams are necessary to raise the standard of living of the Third World
nations, and neither is sufficient without the other.
It should be noted that while many of the Third World nations
(positions 1, 2, 3) blamed the developed nations (position 4) for their
plight and called for a new international economic order, few acknow-
ledged that social and economic reform within their own borders might also
be necessary. And, of course, the developed nations (MDC's) did not
accept the responsibility for the condition of the LCD's.
The World Population Plan
Although it may be hard to imagine any agreement being reached, by the
end of two weeks the 137 governments, four liberation movements, and nine-
teen agencies had adopted 21 resolutions, four recommendations, and a 109
paragraph World Plan of Action (all of which shall be called the World
Population Plan or WPP). The WPP emphasizes the need for economic and
social development and a more equitable distribution of wealth, and de-
emphasizes family planning by citing such programs as being necessary
more for human rights than economic development.
The provisions of the WPP receiving the most widespread and favorable
attention are those pertaining to the status of women. The World Plan of
Action urges governments to "...ensure full participation of women in the
educational, social, economic and political life of their countries on
an equal basis with men" (UN Centre for Economic and Social Information
(UNCESI), 1974:19), while resolutions IV and IX, the only resolutions to
be ratified unanimously, make specific recommendations for the improve-
ment of the status of women, which are supposed to have demographic as
well as humanitarian significance. Improvement in the status of women is
supposed to lead to a reduction in fertility. Although de-emphasizing the
importance of family planning programs, the WPP implies that fertility
will decline when women become "modern," educated, and employed, i.e.,
with development, fertility will fall "naturally". Reinforced by the
1975 International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City, this belief has
become stronger and even more prevalent (as well as simplified) so it has
almost become a truism--give the Third World women good jobs and they won't
have so many babies (Errtzuriz, 1974). The purpose of this paper is to
examine the logic of this conclusion, and raise questions about the demo-
graphic and humanitarian significance of the WPP provisions for the status
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of women. It approaches the problem from two points of view, that of a
demographer and that of a feminist (I tried to keep these perspectives
separate, but since I am a female and a demographer, I was not always
successful).
THIRD WORLD WOMEN
It is difficult to make general statements about women from the
diverse cultures of Africa, Asia, and Latin America which are collect-
ively known as the Third World. I shall be referring primarily to rural
women who vastly outnumber urban women and who bear the majority of the
world's children, who, in turn, are the majority of the world's population
(Sipila, 1974).
The most obvious assumption underlying the idea that employement will
cause a reduction in fertility is that Third World women do not have
anything better to do than have babies, but a few quotes should easily
dispel this notion. According to the International Labor Organization
(ILO), "Rural women work in conditions of real hardship, with primitive
traditional tools .... Drudgery in the fields is combined with household
drudgery, multiplied by the lack or inadequacy of water and cooking
facilities and the lack of child care facilities... (they) are seldom
covered by social legislation of any kind and cannot even avail themselves
of the usual maternity leave. Their work has no proper schedule and their
total hours.. .are excessively long and irregular. Their activity is most
frequently unremunerative and unrewarding" (ILO, 1975:67). Third World
women commonly work 18 hours a day for zero net income and often in
conditions "...which are not commensurate with the dignity of human
beings" (Sipila, 1974); their lot is to be "...underfed, ill, uneducated
and pregnant from the day of their first menstruation until menopause"
(United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (UNFAO), 1975). I have
set up a straw person; of course these women do not have babies because
they have nothing better to do.1 Quite the opposite--they have babies in
spite of long hours, hard physical labor, malnutrition, sickness, and
minimal or no medical care. And while fertility in the LDC's is not under
perfect control, it is important to realize that high fertility is delib-
erate and not just the result of unrestrained physiology (for example, see
Simon, 1974).
lThis is a much more plausible explanation for child bearing where women
are kept at home as symbols of "conspicuous leisure." In fact, fertility
rates often increase in the early states of development for this reason
and because families believe they can afford more children (Papanek, 1975;
Populi, 1975; Simon, 1974)
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Fertility, Education and Employment
The more likely premise underlying the notion that with development
fertility will fall "naturally," is a belief that the experience of the
MDC's will be followed. Thus, the WPP stresses the education of women
and the removal of obstacles to their employment in the non-agricultural
sector. In other words, it is not just work that is important, but non-
farm (urban?) experience and/or employment that is entirely separate from
family life. To assess the reasonableness of this premise, three ques-
tions will be addressed: (1) Is there much empirical support? (2) Is
the theoretical basis sound? (3) Is implementation possible or probable?
Empirical Evidence
It is difficult to establish a causal link between employment and fer-
tility. In the MDC's, women who work tend to have fewer children, but it
is not at all clear if low fertility is the cause or consequence of
employment. And as more and more mothers are entering the labor force,
we may discover that this relationship is due as much to culture as
biology. In addition, the strength of this relationship varies according
to reasons for working and/or social status. The inverse correlation be-
tween fertility and employment is weakest for women of lower education
who must work and for women in occupations labelled feminine, and the
strongest for those with careers as professionals (Sipila, 1974; Dixon,
1975; Simon, 1974). In the rural areas of MDC's the correlation often
disappears, and it has never been adequately established for the LDC's
(Sipila, 1974).
Although it is hard to separate the influence of education from that
of employment or income, education may be the most important factor for
fertility reduction. First, because the type of employment and income
are dependent upon level of education, but also because education seems to
have an independent influence upon fertility. An educated woman is more
likely to learn about the idea and means of family planning and to put
them to use (Simon, 1974; Freedman, 1963). One study of 50 nations found
an inverse relation between education and fertility that was much stronger
for the education of the wife than the husband. But while literacy itself
has a weak association with lower fertility, this relationship is strong
only at levels of education attained by a tiny fraction of Third World
women (Sipila, 1974).
Theoretical Basis
Micro-economic theory has been predominant in the study of fertility.
Explanations are generally cast in terms of the economic and opportunity
cost and benefits of children. Thus an inverse relationship between fer-
tility and employment would result because of the cost of child care if
the mother works and the opportunity cost of a job forgone if she does not
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work. In either case the cost would increase with the status or salary
of the mother's occupation, so the relationship would be expected to be
stronger for career professional women than others. Neglected, however,
in both theory and research, is the opportunity cost of not having
children (i.e., the loss of social identity and status) ind later it will
be proposed that this factor is most important in LDC fertility decisions.
In a thorough monograph on the relationship between income and fertility,
Simon (1974) acknowledges that social norms and values are an important
omission from the micro-economic theoretical framework. He argues that
norms are intermediate, not independent variables and in the long run
(50 or more years), they will catch up with economic effects and thus have
a neutral effect on fertility. Meanwhile the current growth rates of most
LDC's are high enough to cause a doubling of their populations within the
short run, and a tripling or quadrupling within 50 years, which suggests
that norms are as critical as economic variables for policy decisions.
Role conflict or role incompatibility, is the second most frequent ex-
planation for the inverse relationship between employment and fertility.
It is believed that a woman's work role conflicts with her role of mother,
and the more mutually exclusive these roles are (e.g., if children cannot
be at the place of work) the stronger the relationship will be (Dixon,
1975; Germaine, 1975). But this belief is not borne out by reality. The
most obvious contradiction is the large number of mothers who work pre-
cisely because they have more children than their husband's income can
support. Role conflict is at best only a partial answer (it may be impor-
tant for women who are uncertain about working or having children), for
women commonly bear the quadruple burden of being a full-time employee and
wife/mother/housekeeper. These jobs may not be particularly compatible,
and they may be mutually exclusive in terms of time, but instead of sacri-
ficing employment, mothers who want to work or must work, sacrifice sleep,
leisure, recreation and the extra hours needed for job advancement.
2
Although a Third World woman may be pregnant during most of her child
bearing years, "pregnancy, child bearing, lactation, and child rearing do
not debar or deter her from work. Both economic and social roles are
pressed upon her and she accepts them without question" (United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 1975:9). Consequently, for employ-
ment to have a major impact on fertility it must become a legitimate
2
The socialist countries do provide worktime child care, but since tra-
ditional division of labor at home has not changed significantly, women
continue to do the housework, "leisure time" child care, and to stay home
with a sick child or infant (ILO, 1975; Boserup, 1970). One study con-
cludes that this overload is a major reason why employed wives in Eastern
Europe and Russia do not advance very high or very rapidly in their jobs
(Fogarty, Rapoport and Rapoport, 1971).
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alternative to marriage and/or child bearing. Otherwise women will continue
doing quadruple duty by following society's norms regarding the appropriate
family size, and participating in the labor force whenever their help is
wanted.
3
The Possibility and Probability of Education and Employment
As far as education, employment, and income are concerned, rural Third
World women have little to gain by achieving equality with men. Both
males and females are undereducated and underemployed, although men
usually have the advantage. If education and employment are to have a
major influence upon national birth rates, women will not only have to
catch up with men, they will have to surpass them. And unless the over-
all level of opportunity is raised dramatically, women will have to be
given a disproportionate share. However, the prognosis is that the ad-
vancement of women will follow, not lead that of men (National Academy of
Science, 1974).
In 1970, 60 percent of the world's nearly 800 million adultilliterates
were women, and most were Third World residents. Illiteracy is also in-
creasing more rapidly among women than men; between 1960 and 1970 the
number of male illiterates increased by 8 million, while the number of
female illiterates increased by 40 million (United Nations Economic and
Social Council (UNESCO), 1975). Even when education is available,
daughters are often kept out of school to help their mothers, and if
money is short boys are usually given preference. And so the daughters'
education often consists of learning traditional female tasks and sub-
servience (Boserup, 1974; UNECA, 1975; ILO, 1975). Girls in school do
not fare much better. Over half the mass education offered to LDC women
is concerned with "domestic science;" it rarely includes basic skills
such as animal husbandry, kitchen gardening, or poultry keeping, and even
less often agriculture (UNECA, 1975; ILO, 1975: UNESCO, 1975).
The ILO has reported that despite trends toward increased employment
among women, the cultural norms of most countries other than the socialist
nations remain ambivalent about the employment of women. Thus, when unem-
ployment is high among men, it is very difficult to ensure a woman's right
to work. Women workers are seen as "...a threat to men, as intruders in
the male domain" (ILO, 1975:18). The statement of a delegate to a 1964
ILO conference is typical, "I firmly believe that it is a serious error of
judgement for developing countries to ascribe high action priority to
plans for encouraging women to enter the (labor) market, especially women
with family responsibilities, when these same countries do not have or
cannot create sufficient jobs for their male populations" (Boserup, 1970:
195). It is rarely acknowledged that many of these women are heads of
3See Griffith (1974) for evidence of the influence and clarity of norms
for family size. For one discussion of the relationship between the unem-
ployment of males and the employment of females see Bernard, 1974.
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households (Sipila, 1974; Tinker, 1975), and never suggested that the
husband could mind the home and children while the wife works.
Most Third World women who are employed are engaged in agriculture,
cottage industries, and petty trade. In urban areas they are mainly em-
ployed in low status service work. Women in Southeast Asia and Africa
also do heavy labor in mining, road buiding, and construction. In Africa
men generally grow cash crops while women grow food for consumption or
barter. Consequently, most female farm workers are not classified as em-
ployed or economically productive even though they do 60-80 percent of
the agricultural work.
Regardless of the job, women are paid less than men and they are ex-
cluded from apprenticeships and other job training programs, agricultural
extension services, and producer co-ops (ILO, 1975; UNECA, 1975). As one
Bangladesh woman at the International Women's Year Conference explained,
there is no reason for a woman to go out to work if the only job she can
get is doing construction work for a handful of rice. She is better off
learning to weave in her own home (Papanek, 1975).
There is another form of discrimination that is even more ominous. It
appears to be a general pattern for economic development programs to have
a negative affect on the position of Third World women. Women have been
almost completely ignored in development plans, and are not allowed to
learn or use the new manufacturing or agricultural technology (such as a
plow). With mechanization and industrialization, manual labor is desig-
nated as women's work; the petty traders and craftspeople are forced out
of business, but men get the new jobs (UNFAO, 1975; UNECA, 1975; Tinker,
1975).
Development and employment programs have also resulted in massive male
migration. Often the men cannot or do not send money home, and the women
are left with the entire responsibility for their families. Under these
circumstances, "...it is a misnomer to say that women participate in de-
velopment programs. Rather, development policy seems to imply the abne-
gation, sacrifice and submission of women to unacceptable living condi-
tions" (UNFAO,-1975:15).
Summary
The premise that an increase in the level of education and employment
for women will have a major impact on Third World birth rates does not
have a very sound theoretical or empirical basis. The possibility of im-
plementing such programs in the near future is very slim, and the proba-
bility of a large majority of women being allowed to participate in such
programs is equally slim. But if the WPP is trying to recapture the ex-
perience of the MDC's, it may have put the cart before the horse. The
birth rates of some developed nations began to fall before women became
educated or career minded, and in others they remained high during periods
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of industrialization when a large prportion of women were employed.4
What else is necessary?
PRE-REQUISITES FOR A "NATURAL" DECLINE IN FERTILITY
There was nothing automatic, or spontaneous or natural about the de-
cline in the birth rate of the MDC's. Fertility was deliberately reduced
when large families were no longer a biological or economic necessity and
when children became an obstacle to social mobility instead of a source
of status and power.
In many areas of the world, children are still an economic asset. They
are part of the family labor force and the sons are counted upon by their
parents for support in sickness and old age. In most of the Third World,
infant and childhood mortality is still very high and to be assured of
having several adult sons, parents will have a number of extra children.
People do not consult life tables to figure the odds on a child dying;
they behave according to their own experience and in many Third World
nations, it is not unusual for one-third or even one-half the deaths to
occur to children under five. (This is partially a statistical abbera-
tion, resulting from a high risk of mortality plus a large proportion of
the population being in that age group, which in turn, is the result of
sustained high fertility.) Consequently, even though mortality is de-
clining, it might be difficult to convince parents not to have births in
excess of the number of children they desire. These problems are recog-
nized in fertility theory, development programs, and the WPP, but the
last factor, children as a source of status and power, i.e., the oppor-
tunity cost of not having children, is generally ignored. In fact, this
may be the key to understanding high fertility and the design of develop-
meit or population policies.
The Social Status of Parents and Non-Parents
Ronald Freedman, among others, has made a convincing argument that
fertility is so important to a society that its control is never left
solely in the hands of individual couples. He concludes that even after
LDC infant mortality declines, LDC fertility will not get substantially
lover because social norms and institutions are such that people want
more than a few children (Freedman, 1963; also see Bernard, 1974).
Obviously, institutionalized pronatalism does not just affect women, but
it has resulted in societies where a woman's primary, if not only, reason
for existence is to be a wife and mother. There is no need to go into
4For example, fertility fell well before industrialization in France,
but not until long after urbanization and industrialization in England.
See Goldscheider (1972) for an explanation and a further discussion of
the relationship between fertility and modernization.
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details of the enforcement of these roles, they have been well documented.
But as a reminder that Third World women are coerced to a degree far
beyond what occurs in this country: Third World women are subjected to
child marriages, arranged marriages, purdah, and polygamy. There are
areas where an unmarried daughter is a disgrace to her family, where an
infertile wife may be returned to her parents, where a girl may have to
prove she is fertile to ensure a marriage, where widows are inherited
and the practice of suttee has only recently disappeared. There are areas
where the birth of a female child may be a cause for sorrow, where adul-
teresses are stoned to death and adulterers are congratulated, where
female infanticide was once common and now females are systematically de-
prived so that even nursing mothers may eat only if there are left-overs.
And in many of these areas women accept their condition without question
and raise their daughters to be equally subservient and obedient.
The opportunity costs of not marrying and not having children are very
high indeed, and without intervention, opportunity costs are not likely
to change rapidly. Why? First, if Simon (1974) is correct, changes in
norms about marriage and child bearing will lag way behind changes in the
ecohomic system. The second, and perhaps most important, reason is Third
World men. It is not likely that they will permit a change in social re-
lationships as long as their own status is derived mainly from dominance
over women and the number of children they father. For instance, there is
fairly consistent evidence that Third World husbands want more children
than their wives do, and that male dominance in the home is associated
with resistance among husbands to a wife using or even knowing about con-
traceptives (Dixon, 1975). Even in Africa where married women are com-
monly required to support themselves and their children, they are also
expected to have lots of children (UNECA, 1975; Simon, 1973; Boserup,
1970). Thus African studies show a positive relationship between women's
employment and fertility. In a study of literate couples in Nairobi,
Kenya, approximately one-fourth of the husbands, but over one-half of the
wives felt there is "...nothing good about many children," while two-thirds
of the husbands but less than one-third of the wives believed: "A woman has
a duty to her husband and is relatives to have as many children as possi-
ble" (Martin, 1970: 16,6). Furthermore, some family planning organiza-
tions in Africa, being dominated by men, have made a requirement that women
must have the consent of their husbands to receive services (Ware, 1975).
Summary
The notion of a "natural" decline in fertility (and the corresponding
"unnaturalness" of contraception and family planning programs) is very mis-
5With the weakening of tribal bonds, African men use Western justifica-
tion to retain their position of authority by appealing to educational
differences instead of tribal rights (Boserup, 1970).
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leading. Birth rates decline when social and economic conditions are
such that people want fewer children. Then they postpone sexual unions,
contracept, abort and, if necessary, commit infanticide. If the history
of the lVC's is any guide, Third World fertility will not fall until a
constellation of conditions are met including reduced infant mortality,
a decline in the economic value of children, and a change in the defini-
tion of status for both men and women.6 But the emplo ment of women may
only make a minor contribution to fertility reduction.-
CONCLUSIONS
By now a vicious circle should be evident: fertility will not fall
until the status of women has changed, the status of women will not
change until the status of men changes, the status of men will not change
without a rise in the standard of living, and an adequate rise in the
standard of living may not be possible without a reduction in fertility.
Economic development is essential but, if it is to be successful, there
must be direct intervention in fertility decisions in order to break the
vicious circle. Along with development programs there must be an inten-
sive effort to change pronatalist institutions and attitudes and to en-
courage and reward low fertility.
8
6This is an area which requires more investigation, but it may be use-
ful to make a distinction between the definition of status and the source
of one's status. The onset of the fertility decline in the MDC's appears
to have been tied to a change in the definition of status from family
size to material well being. But since the status of women was measured
by the status of husbands, a genuine improvement in the status of women,
i.e., social equality, was not necessary for a reduction in fertility.
Men still had control over women and reproduction. It is only recently
that the identity and social worth of women has come to be measured in-
dependently of their marital state or husband's social status, and this
ma3 have contributed to more recent declines in fertility.
Development planners are increasingly concerned that economic and
social development cannot and/or should not follow the pattern of the
capitalist and/or industrialized nations. They believe crafts, cottage
industries, intermediate technology in farming and manufacturing may be
more feasible and desirable than large scale capital intensive industry
and agriculture (Teitelbaum, 1974; Schumacher, 1973). If so, women would
be less likely to leave home to work, and children could be part of the
family labor force. If this is the case, development might not reduce
birth rates. This is not an argument against development; it is further
evidence that a fertility decline may not be a "natural" consequence of
development.
8To date, all birth planning or birth reduction incentive programs and
proposals require the recipient to be married and to have at least two,
and more often three, children.
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If the preceding reasoning 1s correct, then the WPP will do little to-
ward reducing population growth or raising the status of women. It con-
fronts fertility only indirectly through the unrealistic proposals of
providing women with high levels of education and employment, and pro-
vides absolutely no means or ideas for the implementation of these pro-
grams. 9 It encourages freedom and voluntarism in family planning, while
leaving the men primarily in charge of these decisions. It stresses the
basic right of every couple to have as many or as few children as desired,
but does nothing to directly reduce the social significance of marraige
and children, or to reduce the power of pronatalist norms and institutions.
To the contrary, the WPP declares the family (read at least husband, wife,
and child) to be the basic and most critical unit of society. At the same
time it minimizes the importance of family planning programs for fertility
reduction even though an estimated 70 percent of the world's couples (and
even more unmarried individuals) do not have access to birth control in-
formation and services (Planned Parenthood, 1974). How could this be?
How could a World Population Conference formulate a plan that does not
make demographic sense? Since the WPP also does not seem to do as much
for women as it is credited, it might be of value to try to answer this
question from a feminist perspective.
The obvious response might be that the conference was dominated by men,
and Third World men did not realize that Third World women want fewer
children and want greater control over reproduction. Women, especially
Third World women, made these views clear at the UN International Women's
Conference the following year. Family planning was given high priority
(in fact it was a "demand"), and the resolutions on population and birth
control were stronger than those in the WPP (Populi, 1975; UNCESI, 1975).
And when some American women denounced family planning assistance to the
LDC's as imperialistic, they were harshly rebuked by Third World women
who "...gave dramatic testimony to their desparate need with compelling
stories of constant child bearing and botched illegal abortions" (Zero
Population Growth (ZPG , 1975).
But to say that men are stupid or insensitive begs the question and
ignores the hypocrisy that dominated the World Population Conference. Is
it possible that the WPP emerged as it did because it is a smoke screen
to divert attention away from what is really happening in some countries,
and away from the fact that many national leaders are not willing to do
what is necessary to bring about economic development, to raise the status
of women, and to control rapid population growth? While there may be many
reasons for this reluctance (such as the creation of a new international
9
To add a bit of irony to the unreality of the WPP: perhaps nowhere is
the condition of women as low as in India, where, according to law, women
are totally equal to men (Kapur, 1975).
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economic order demanded by the Third World), it could be argued that a
primary reason is that men do not want to lose control over reproduction.
The necessity of maintaining control goes back to Freedman's argument
that reproduction is much too important to be left in the control of in-
dividuals. Whether fertility is high or low, survival ultimately depends
on its control. Furthermore, population size or growth is often equated
with the political or military strength of a system, or subgroup within
the system. Whoever controls fertility truly wields a great deal of
power. While most of this control lies with women, they are not and
rarely have been allowed to exercise it. Thus, while the World Popula-
tion Conference appeared to be dominated by the politics of economic
systems, it might be hypothesized that the WPP was the result of sexual
politics; the dominance of women by men in order to control reproduction
(Millet, 1970). According to Millet, at one time there were fertility
cults and women were perhaps even powerful.1 0 But something happened
(such as the discovery of paternity), which resulted in patriarchal
societies and religions with the basic postulate of male supremacy, and
the central function of validating the patriarchal structure. Today the
chief patriarchal institution is the family; it enforces conformity to
this system and socializes the young to this ideology (Goode, 1964;
Millet, 1970). And from the patriarchal system we have gotten the
"principle of legitimacy," a de facto or de jure law that a birth should
not occur to a woman who is not attached to a man. Perhaps this is why
the WPP stresses the supremacy of the family and why the WPP and other
development programs only acknowledge the wife-mother and not the not-
wife-mother, even though one-third of the world's mothers are not-wives
(Sipila, 1974; Tinker, 1975).
Further indication of the possible unwillingness of men to allow women
to control reproduction can be found in a portion of the UN Declaration of
Human Rights which was included in the WPP. It states that all couples
(not individuals) have the right to plan the number and spacing of their
ehildren. The WPP does state that individuals have the right to receive
tOther feminists such as Firestone (1970) believe women do not have
social power because pregnancy and breast feeding are so debilitating,
i.e., power was not wrenched from them by men. But a look at anthropo-
logical literature (see, for example, Kolata, 1974) or Third World Women
should make one realize the cause of the disability is social, not biolog-
ical. Silveira (1975) carries Millet's argument further, by suggesting
egalitarian control over reproduction is not possible; a society on such
a course would eventually become a matriarchy. She believes women's con-
trol over reproduction may be the best indicator of women's power and
status. This may be true, but it is doubtful if women will have control
over reproduction until they have enough power and status to control the
means of controlling reproduction.
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contraceptive services, but apparently the use of the term "individual"
instead of "couple" was strongly contested and it appeared in the final
document only through a "procedural fluke" (ZPG, 1975). In contrast, the
delegates to the International Women's Year Conference generally accepted
the right of individuals to family planning services (ZPG, 1975).
The patriarchal system serves men well as long as high fertility is
important or at least not detrimental. But now that lower fertility may
be essential, and the most reliable contraceptive methods are for fe-
males,I I and women are the most motivated to reduce fertility, Third World
leaders are finding themselves in an awkward position. Without further
technological advances, the only way to reduce the birth rate without
overtly coercive policies, is to change the system so the elites lose con-
trol over the majority of men (and the status of men rises) or so the men
lose control over women (and the status of women rises). None of these
alternatives would be appealing to the political elites of the world.
As a consequence, the participants of the WPP behaved in a hypocritical
way, produced an equally hypocritical document, and governments around the
world are behaving in the same fashion. For example, some of the countries
which denied demographic realities and were loath to discuss birth control
at the conference are now, "...expanding birth control programs with un-
precedented haste" (Stokes, 1975:2). Meanwhile the United States, which
stressed the importance of family planning programs reduced this part of
its foreign aid budget, and Saudi Arabia banned the distribution and use
of contraceptives. At the conference, China promoted the position that
rapid population growth is good and family planning programs are "unnatural"
and unnecessary; and now China (which could have set such a good example)
has the world's most effective birth reduction policies and programs. But
India is certainly the greatest hypocrite of all. At the conference, India
was one of a group of countries that was emphatic about the impropriety of
fertility reduction programs that are even slightly coercive (Mauldin,
Choucri, et al., 1974). Shortly after a highly coercive (and often com-
pulsory) sterilization program was initiated India, and is said to have
contributed to the downfall of Indira Ghandi.
1 1Condoms are almost as effective as the intra-uterine device or birth
control pills, but only if the user is strongly motivated to use them
consistently and properly.1 2Newspapers have reported that Indira Ghandi blamed the "menfolk" of
India for the lack of success of programs to reduce fertility in that
country. Ghandi believes Indian women are interested in having smaller
families but the men have created a stumbling block for the national cam-
paign to limit families to three children. Here is further evidence that
a reduction in fertility may not occur unless men are able to achieve
status in ways that have nothing to do with the control of women or the
fathering of children, or women are given full control over fertility.
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There are other points of view from which to analyze the conference;
certainly much of the rhetoric and hypocrisy stemmed from the desire to
present the proper ideological face. Nevertheless, the feminist per-
spective raises some interesting questions which should be investigated.
I will conclude with one further observation from this perspective. One
consequence of patriarchal societies is that women have become victims of
promatallst institutions which have denied them control of reproduction.
Another consequence was the shifting of credit for reproduction from fe-
males to males. Traditionally a woman has been thought to do nothing more
than provide a growing place for the tiny person planted in her by a man.
Even today in the Third World, a wife is blamed (and often cast aside) if
a couple is sterile, but the husband gets the credit if the couple is
fertile. This too serves men well as long as high fertility is desirable.
If the WPP does nothing else, it allows men to retain control over fer-
fility, and, at the same time, shifts the blame for continued high fer-
tility over to the women.
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